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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW- PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF CRIM-
INAL NEWS PROHIBITED.-A New York statute,1 under which the
defendant was convicted, made it a misdemeanor to distribute pub-
lications "principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or
accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures or stories of deeds of blood-
shed, lust or crime." The New York Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction, construing the statute to include publications containing
a collection of criminal deeds "so massed as to become vehicles for
inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person." 2 The case
was then presented to the United States Supreme Court to be re-
viewed as violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution in that accused's rights to procedural due process were
denied.3 Held, *the conviction reversed. In a six-to-three decision,
the Supreme Court ruled that even as so interpreted by the New
York Court of Appeals, the statute was vague, uncertain, and did
rot set up an adequate standard of conduct. Winters v. New York,
333 U. S. 597, 92 L. ed. 654 (1948).
The law must put the reasonable man on notice as to what acts
constitute the crime.4 Thus the following were held void for un-
certainty: a statute punishing the acceptance of "excessive prices for
any necessaries," 5 a law forbidding a state contractor to pay less
than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality,6 legislation
making it a crime for any unemployed ex-criminal to join a "gang"; 7
in relation to limitations upon expression, a law prohibiting the dis-
play of any symbol or emblem in opposition to organized govern-
ment,8 and a statute punishing the distribution of pamphlets intended
at any time in the future to result in forcible resistance to law.9 Men
of common intelligence are not required to guess at the meaning of
the proscribed crime.10 However, the mere fact that a penal statute
is so framed as to require a jury upon occasion to determine a ques-
tion of reasonableness is not sufficient to make it too vague as a prac-
tical guide to permissible conduct; 11 "the law is full of instances
where a man's fate depends upon a jury estimating rightly, some
matter of degree." 12 The Supreme Court upheld a statute punishing
one who used abusive words in public that would incite an average
I N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1141-2.
2 People v. Winters, 294 N. Y. 545, 63 N. E. 2d 98 (1945).
3U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1 (1868).
4 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com., 286 U. S. 210, 76 L. ed.
1063 (1932).
5 Weeds v. United States, 255 U. S. 109, 65 L. ed. 537 (1921).
6 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 70 L. ed. 323 (1926).
7Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 83 L. ed. 889 (1939).
8 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 75 L. ed. 1117 (1931).
9 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 81 L. ed. 1066 (1937).
10 See note 7 supra.
"'United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 86 L. ed. 383 (1942).
12 Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 375, 57 L. ed. 1233, 1235 (1913).
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man to breach the peace; 1- a law making it a crime to advocate the
overthrow of government by unlawful force; 14 and a statute penal-
izing a person who edited printed matter tending to encourage and
advocate disrespect for law.15
In the case under discussion, two factors were present along with
the rights of the individual to a fair criminal standard: (1) the local
need to stamp out crimes arising from such publications and (2) the
ability to strictly define the scope of the subject matter in question.
Although it does not deny that a state may punish circulation of
objectionable printed matter, the court maintains that the clause "so
massed as to incite crime" can become meaningful only by concrete
instances, since it has no technical nor common law definition. 16 The
dissent expresses doubt as to whether more clarity can be reached.
Should the New York legislature enumerate the objectionable pub-
lications, or are they to specify in detail the ingredients that incite
these violent and depraved crimes? 17 Why does the lewd and ob-
scene which have always been condemned by the courts enjoy a con-
stitutional prerogative over criminal tales that lead to bloodshed? Is
If it be granted that the material considered objectionable can be no
more clearly defined by our legislatures, there remains the problem
whether the expediency of the state must bow to the individual's
right to have notice of an ascertainable standard of guilt. The court
here felt that the need did not justify the sanctioning of a statute
deemed repugnant to due process of law.
V. O'N.
CRIMINAL LAW - PuRE FOOD AND DRUG ACT - MISLEADING
LITERATURE ACCOMPANYING DRUG IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-
Defendant was tried and convicted for violations of Section 301. of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938.1 Each
violation arose out of the shipping of a drug in interstate commerce,
and the subsequent shipment of explanatory literature to the same
consignee, which literature contained certain false and misleading
statements, thereby rendering the drug misbranded 2 within the mean-
13 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 86 L. ed. 1031 (1942).
14 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
'5 Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 59 L. ed. 575 (1915).
16 Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 597, 92 L. ed. 654, 662 (1948).
17 Ibid.
18 See note 16 supra.
152 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 301 (1946).
"The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited:
(a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce
of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.
252 STAT. 1050 (1938), 21 U. S. C. §352 (1946).
"A drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded ...
(a) If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular ......
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